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This paper describes the ideas behind the promotion of flood control work in the history of flood 
control on the Yellow River. Broadly, the conclusion is that the conflict between the ideas of civil 
government and considerations of national sovereignty and national defence are visible here. 
Yellow River flood control, and in particular, flood control as major construction overseen by the 
central government, is mainly performed downstream of the Yellow River, on the so-called "North 
China Plain". This is a map of the North China Plain (Fig. 1). This is a geologic map of the North 
China Plain (Fig. 2). The Yellow River forms a type of fan while flowing both north and south on the 
North China Plain. With regard to this branch in the flow of the Yellow River, however, when its 
continuous history is regarded, the most basic framework can be said to be the sinking of the land of 
the North China Plain due to geotectonic movement, which is called neotectonic movement that 
happened in the middle and later periods of the Himalayan orogeny. This is a distribution diagram of 
the rise and fall of the Earth's crust between approximately 3 .4 million years ago and today due to this 
neotectonic movement (Fig. 3). Looking at this, the sinking is great in the northern North China Plain, 
at more than -500m. The sinking around the flow of the Huaihe River, which is in the saddle of 
modem central Henan Province, is considerable, at greater than -200m. Seen from this elevation 
diagram, the most natural flow of the Yellow River, which emerges in upper Zhengzhou today, is to 
flow north from there along the Taiheng Shan mountain range until it reaches the same latitude as 
Tianjin, and then to flow east through eastern Tianjin into the sea. Further, the flow can also be said to 
branch en route to emerge in the upper part of the modem estuary delta and further north. In reality, 
the flow of the Yellow River as understood from various historical data ever since the Holocene epoch 
has always broadly been along these two branches. 
After the last glacial period ended, during the warm period, there was a cold period called the 
Younger Dryas that lasted for 1,300 years approximately IO thousand years BCE, followed by a period 
of rapid warming, which is deemed to be the start of the Holocene epoch. From around 6,500 BCE to 
2,000 BCE, this period of considerably stable warming continued, and there are clusters of 
archaeological remains to indicate the start of agriculture independently in the three regions of the 
eastern foothills of the Taiheng-Shan mountain range (modem-day western Handan), north of the 
Shandong mountain mass adjacent to the alluvial plain, and in the eastern foothills of southern 
Zhengzhou. Ever since, agricultural cultures based on these have continued to spread, but none have 
made any real inroads into the central region of the North China Plain. 
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The most stable warm period continued from 5,000 to 4,000BCE, but looking at the distribution of 
remains from the Yangshao culture, which appeared at this time (red dots in Fig. 4), it stopped 
spectacularly at the modem Jing-Guang railway line as can be seen, and east from there made no 
inroads into the central North China Plain. From about 2,000BCE, Longshan culture arose, but its 
remains are also distributed centred on the hills around the Shandong Mountain mass and the 
Jing-Guang railway line. There are remains in the exact centre of the North China Plain in this area, 
however, but this is presumed to have probably been sited on a diluvial bed. 
Changes can be seen after the start of the Holocene epoch of the Yellow River waterways leading to 
the present day, which are shown in the diagram (Fig. 5). In the ancient times from the Yangshao to the 
Longshan culture, of which I am currently speaking, the main waterways of the Yellow River were this 
yellow line, the southern flow, and the upper tip of the modem estuary delta. This has been made 
evident by examinations of the ancient delta region of the Yellow River in this area. 
Although not perfectly understood, it is estimated that these tributaries from the waterways arose 
within several hundred years after 2,000BCE, and a waterway appeared that travelled north from the 
Taiheng Shan mountain range, near Tianjin, and into the sea. 
The more northerly of these two waterways is called the "Yugonghe" according to the "Yogong", an 
ancient document that records the path of the watery, and the other, older waterway to the southeast is 
called the "Hanzhi-he" according to the "Han shu" and "Gou-xu zhi", ancient documents which, 
naturally enough, record the path of this waterway (Fig. 6). In both cases, the lowest point of flow is 
unknown, with both waterways spreading out by dividing into so may flows that which is the main 
flow cannot be stated with any certainty. 
These conditions continued, but in the middle Zhanguo period, the Qi from the east of the Hanzhi-he 
River, and the Zhao and Wei from the west, built embankments on both sides of the river to fix it as 
the boundaries between their nations. The Yugong River was dammed by the embankments built on 
the west bank by the Zhao and Wei, and the river 's flow was cut off. 
From the middle Zhanguo period, the development of arable land spread in the central region of the 
North China Plain. The construction of levees also progressed as a consequence. The flow of silt 
downstream of the Yellow River increased due to the development of the Weihe and Funhe river 
basins in the middle basin, and the river flows converged at the Hanzhi-he River, raising the 
Hanzhi-he riverbed, so the embankments failed when the water levels in creased, thus causing 
flooding. In the end, the embankments failed in the east around Puyang, and a comparatively stable 
waterway consequently emerged. During the reign of the Emperor Ming, the second emperor of the 
Hou Han dynasty, in 69 to 70CE, major reconstruction and repair of the waterway was implemented 
by Wang Jing, basically to use embankments to augment the stable waterway that had appeared 
naturally. 
This is a diagram of the waterway determined by Wang Jing's river administration (Fig. 7). The 
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important thing in Wang Jing 's river governance was planning and implementation from the viewpoint 
of a civil government. The core of Wang Jing's river administration was not the building of 
embankments, but the creation of an artificial canal system called "Canal Bian", which is written here. 
This was the provision of an infrastructure for the stability and development of an agricultural 
economy in the region, coupled with irrigation routes and waterways for ships on the plains of what is 
today Henao Province in the North China Plain, and had been required by the people of the region for 
a long time. The creation of the embankments was one link in the provision of this canal system. 
The waterway determined by Wang Jing remained stable for approximately 800 years thereafter, and 
then from the latter half of the Tang Dynasty entered a period of instability, but continued to function 
as a main waterway until the North Song Dynasty. 
With the beginning of the North Song Dynasty in 1048, the Yellow River finally collapsed fatally in 
Chanzhou in the north, and a waterway arose that led to Tianjin and flowed into the sea. This was 
called the "Northern Flow''. Further, in 1060, the river collapsed to the east in Damingfu, and a 
waterway arose southeast of there. This was called the "Eastern Flow" (Fig. 8). 
Ever since, the central government has argued policy over whether to leave the "Northern Flow" as is, 
or so dam it up and divert to the "Eastern Flow''. The main policy has tended towards damming up the 
"Northern Flow", and making the "Eastern Flow" into the main waterway. This policy has been tried 
three times, and succeeded twice, but 12 years after the first attempt and five years after the second 
attempt, the Yellow River collapsed to the north and the "Northern Flow" was restored. In other words, 
it is presumed that the "Northern Flow" was indeed the most natural and stable waterway at the time. 
The central government of the Northern Song, however, implemented construction to change to the 
"Eastern Flow" by force from the most natural and stable route, and so compounded failure with 
failure, ending with a massive waste of personnel and material. Consequently, the agricultural 
economy of the northern half of the North China Plain fell into unrecoverable decline. 
The biggest reason for the Northern Song central government's intransigence over the "Eastern Flow" 
was the military and national defence advantages. At the time, the country of Khitai , which is beyond 
modem Beijing and called Liao in Chinese, was pressing for attack, so the Northern Song decided to 
broaden the ring of lakes and marshes that originally spread west from Tianjin to create a buffer zone 
against the southern advance of the Khitai army. If here we consider the Yellow River only as the 
"Northern Flow", the waterlogged areas become covered with silt, and it would be difficult to halt the 
southern advance by the cavalry. This can be cited as a major reason for the policy of eliminating this 
"Northern Flow''. Further, even if the cavalry boarded boats to come by sea, they would land further 
north due to the more south-easterly flow of the Yellow River, and this would enable the "Eastern 
Flow" waterway to be used as a national line of defence. 
In other words, the forced construction of embankments by the North Song central government against 
the natural trend of the waterway was done from the viewpoint of a national defence strategy, not from 
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the viewpoint of civil government, which aimed to stabilize and improve the local agricultural 
economy of the region along the shores of the Yellow River. 
After the start of the South Song Dynasty, the path of the Yellow River was massively diverted from 
its flow across the northern half of the North China Plain, thus starting the era of the "Southern Flow", 
where it flowed into the Huaihe River system to converge with the Huaihe River before flowing into 
the Yellow Sea. This "Southern Flow" waterway, however, was unnatural and unstable from the start, 
even in light of the "rise and fall" of the Earth's crust, which was shown before (Fig. 3). By diverting 
to the south past the sunken saddle that runs almost perfectly east-west in the southern part of 
Zhengzhou, the river flow travels diagonally southward. As this saddle is positioned considerably to 
the south of the exit of the flow into the North China Plain, however, it was probably more natural for 
the river itself to flow north around Zhengzhou. Heading south was truly unstable in this region. 
Diverting to the "Southern Flow" was, from the start, for artificial reasons rather than according to 
natural trends. 
After the Jin Dynasty army invaded the city of Dongjing (modern-day Kaifeng City), besieging it and 
bringing about the destruction of the North Song, they returned north in 1127, but the following year, 
the Jin Dynasty army once again marched south. At the time, Du Chong, who was taking charge of 
Dongjing in their absence, destroyed the Yellow River to the east to thwart the southwards march of 
the Jin Dynasty army. This led to the emergence of a waterway when the overflow headed south from 
the east to converge with the Huaihe River, before discharging into the Yellow Sea. Later, this 
"Southern Flow" waterway became the border between the Jin and South Song. In other words, the 
"Southern Flow" waterway itself was created and maintained from the start for reasons of national 
security. 
From the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty, despite the further damming of the eastern and northern 
overflow of the "Southern Flow" from the viewpoint of a new national sovereignty, the fact was that 
the overflow to the south was left as it was, uncorrected. The reason being, to create the Jing-Hang 
Canal. 
The Jing-Hang Canal used this "Southern Flow" waterway from Xuzhou southwards. Further, the 
addition of lock gates to the eastern side of the Shandong Mountain mass gradually raised the water 
level, so that when it receded, ships could travel on it. The volume of water was also low, and became 
clogged up in here. When the north of the "Southern Flow" waterway was destroyed, the waterway 
overflowed to the east, and this part was attacked directly as shown, leading to the damming of the 
Jing-Hang Canal (Fig. 9 and Fig. I 0). During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, four million bushels of 
rice were transported via the Jing-Hang Canal to the then-capital (modern-day Beijing), so the main 
objective of quelling the Yellow River water was to protect the Jing-Hang Canal from the destruction 
and flooding of the Yellow River. In any case, construction and repairs such as embankments were 
made with the primary objective of maintaining the Jing-Hang Canal, which was the main route for 
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the food supplies that sustained the capital, Beijing, which bad been set for geopolitical reasons, and 
not from policies for the Yellow River performed from a civil government viewpoint of stabilizing and 
improving the local people. 
In the twilight of the Ming Dynasty, during the Wanli era, Pan Jixun implemented construction to 
systematically maintain and repair the Jing-Hang Canal, Hongze Hu Lake, Huaihe River, and the 
waterways downstream of the Yellow River, and to create a high-level system of embankments (Fig. 
11 ). Further, at the beginning of the Qing Dynasty, under the rule of the Emperor Kangxi, Jin Fu and 
Chen Huang implemented construction to further refine the water-controlling ideas of Pan Jixun. 
These water-controlling ideas, based on systematic observations, are imbued with the spirit of 
Neo-Confucianism, which is the essence of civilian governmental thought in China. On this point, 
civilian governmental ideas, which are the backbone to the water-controlling notions of Wang Jing of 
the How Han Dynasty, can be said to govern the character of the water-control construction work even 
here, but it cannot be denied that the framework to the greatest policy was the enacting of these 
water-controlling ideas with the basic objectives of protecting and maintaining the Jing-Hang Canal as 
the main artery for the food supplies that sustained Beijing, and the basic objective of water control by 
the central government. This is because the ultimate objective was the fortification of the 
southern-flowing waterway. 
This ends my attempts to elucidate the opposition between the ideas of civil government and the 
sovereign and national defence considerations that were behind these historical water-controlling 
works. Policies vis-a-vis the Yellow River that focused on considerations of national sovereignty and 
defence rather than the people in the region along the banks of the Yellow River downstream were 
adopted as the main platform from the North Song through the Qing Dynasties, so the North China 
Plain ended up becoming a wasteland. There is great interest in what shape water-control operations 
will take in modem China. 
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Fig 1 .Map of North China Plain 
* Standard Atlas of China (1995) ,P42 
Fig 3 . Map of neotectonic movement 
* Geological Atlas of China (2002), P52 
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Fig 2 . Geologic Map of North China Plain 
* Geological Atlas of China (2002), Pll 
Fig 4 .Map of Yangshao culture remains in North 
China Plain BC5000 • red dots 
* The Historical Atlas of China Vl .P7-8 
Fig 5 .Changes of waterway (Hollocene epoch--) 
* .Jd:i':l'tfl!~foJ 1'+4' ( 2006), P84 
Fig 6 . Waterway (Yugonghe, Hanzhi-he) Changes 
• Studies on Historical Geomorphology and Ancient Maps of China, 
(2006) ' p 369 
Fig 8 .Waterway in Yellow River, (North Song dynasty) 
* History of water engineering development in China (2005), Pl89 
FiglO. Waterway in Yellow River (Ming dynasty) 
• History of water engineering development in China (2005), Pl89 
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Fig 7 . Waterway determined by Wang Jing 
• History of water engineering development in China (2005), P68 
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Fig 9. Waterway in Yellow River,( Qing dynasty) 
• History of water engineering development in China (2005), Pl89 
Figll. High-level system of embankments (Ming 
dynasty) * l!Jl'.RJl~(PJ7)( .'i!VHlfi:2¥;IID l l;Zfi;iPJ(1998) ,P327 
